Using Brokerage Commissions to Secure IPO Allocations by Fjesme, Sturla Lyngnes et al.
 Working Paper  
No. 4/2010 
  
November 2010  
Using Brokerage Commissions to 
Secure IPO Allocations 
Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme, Roni Michaely and 
Øyvind Norli 
© Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme, Roni Michaely and Øyvind Norli 2011. All rights reserved. Short sections of 
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, provided that full credit, 
including © notice, is given to the source. This paper can be downloaded without charge from the CCGR 
website http://www.bi.no/ccgr 
1Using Brokerage Commissions to Secure IPO Allocations1
.
Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme2
The Norwegian School of Management (BI)
.
Roni Michaely
Cornell University and the Interdisciplinary Center
.
Øyvind Norli
The Norwegian School of Management (BI)
November 11, 2011
JEL classication: G24; G28
Keywords: IPO allocations; Equity issue; Commission; Rent seeking
1We are grateful to Jay Ritter, Øyvind Bøhren, François Derrien, seminar participants at the Norwegian School of
Management for valuable suggestions, The Center for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR)at the Norwegian
School of Management for nancial support, the Oslo Stock Exchange VPS for providing the data and the investment
banks and companies that helped us locate the listing prospectuses. All errors are our own.
2The Norwegian School of Management (BI), Nydalsveien 37, 0484 Oslo, Norway. E-mail address:
SLF87@johnson.cornell.edu Telephone: 607-793-6911.
2Abstract
Using data, at the investor level, on the allocations of shares in initial public o¤erings
(IPOs), we document a strong positive relationship between the amount of stock-trading
commission and the number of shares an investor receives in a subsequent IPO. We nd
no evidence to support the idea that investment banks allocate shares to investors that
are perceived to be long-term investors. Our ndings are consistent with the view that
investment banks are able to capture some of the prots earned by investors when
participating in underpriced IPOs.
31. Introduction
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has since the early 2000s investigated the
initial public o¤ering (IPO) allocation practices of several major investment banks. One concern is
that IPO allocations are tied to excessively large stock-trading commissions and that such a practice
would constitute illegal kickbacks from investors to investment banks. Reuter (2006) points out that
such kickbacks would allow the underwriter to share more of the benets of underpriced IPOs
and, therefore, exacerbate the agency conict that exists between the issuing rm and the lead
underwriter of the IPO. This paper investigates whether or not investors that has generated large
stock-trading commissions in the past receives a preferential treatment in future IPO allocations.
Using data on the stock-holdings for every single investor that owned common shares that was
listed or became listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the period 1993 through 2007, we are
able to link stock-trading commission and IPO allocation at the investor level. The main nding of
the paper is a strong and robust positive relationship between the level of stock-trading commission
generated by an investor prior to the IPO and the number of shares the same investor receives
through the IPO allocation. It can be argued that large investors that generate more commissions
are likely to apply for more IPO shares. However, the economic and statistical signicance of
the relationship between commission and allocation is robust to controlling for the market value
of the investors portfolio, as well as to other investor characteristics. We conclude that investors
generating large stock-trading commission receives the most IPO shares because of the commission
they generate. Other investor characteristics are of less or no importance for IPO allocations.
The empirical research on the allocation practices of investment banks have been hampered
by the lack of data on IPO allocations.3 Since information about stock-trading commissions are
equally hard to come by, there is little empirical research on the relationship between commissions
3See Ritter (2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) for papers that study IPO allocations and summarizes IPO
allocation studies.
4and allocations. One exception, and the paper closest to ours, is Reuter (2006) who nds a positive
correlation between brokerage commission paid by mutual funds to lead investment banks and the
holdings in IPOs underwritten by the same banks. This suggests, in general, that having a business
relationship with the lead underwriter increases the chance of getting shares in underpriced IPOs.
In particular, it suggests that investors can buyallocations by channeling their trades through
the brokerage arm of the lead underwriter. In another related paper, Nimalendran, Ritter and
Zhang (2006) show that there is a positive relationship between money left on the table in IPOs
and trading volume in liquid shares around IPO allocation dates. This is indirect evidence of a
positive relationship between trading commission and IPO allocations.
The strength of our paper, compared to the existing literature, is that we are able to ana-
lyze exact allocations at the investor level. In the main part of the paper, we study 24,560 IPO
allocations.4 The existing literature has suggested at least three potential explanations for what
determines investment banksdecision of which investors are getting shares in oversubscribed IPOs.
First, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggest that investment banks allocate IPO shares to informed
investors in return for a truthful revelation of their valuation of the issuer. Second, investment
banks themselves tend to argue that they are looking for long-term investors. Third, investment
banks allocate shares to investors that can provide some form of kickback.
The empirical literature provides mixed results in terms of understanding IPO allocation in the
light of the above three potential explanations.5 An important contribution of our paper is that
we examine and contrast all three potential explanations simultaneously. As already mentioned,
our data strongly support the view that investors can secure themselves IPO allocations through
large stock-trading commissions. We nd no evidence of a preferential treatment of buy-and-hold
4These exact allocations are from 30 di¤erent IPOs. In other words, there are 24,560 unique investor-IPO com-
binations in our data. In robustness tests, we also study 165,562 investor-IPO pairs where the IPO allocation data
might be contaminated with some post-IPO trading.
5Table 1 summarizes related papers.
5investors. Neither do we nd any support for the idea that investors get allocation in return for
revealing private information about issuing rm value.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the related literature. Section 3
describes theoretical predictions and the testable implications. Section 4 describes the data set.
Section 5 gives the empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
Ritter (2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) argue that there are three views on how IPOs
are allocated. First, is the academic view based on Benveniste and Spindt (1989). In this view,
investment banks allocate IPO shares to informed investors in return for true valuation and demand
information. Second, is the pitchbook view where investment banks allocate shares to institutional
investors that are likely to be buy-and-hold. Finally, is the rent seeking view (prot sharing view)
where investment banks allocate shares to investors in return for some form of kickback. Previous
studies have found support for each of these views and against the academic view and the pitchbook
view. These views are not mutually exclusive. It is also limited empirical research on the rent seeking
view due to data limitations. In this paper, we compare the three views to determine which view
is more important. Previous studies have investigated these views one by one. The exception is
Jenkinson and Jones (2004) that compares the academic view to the pitchbook view. All related
papers are summarized in Table 1.
Many papers investigates the academic view alone, as described by Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) investigate the order book of 23 and 16 international IPOs and SEOs.
They nd that regularly participating, large bid and domestic participants are favored in allocations.
They also nd that bidders that participate in both hot and cold issues are given larger allocations
in hot issues. Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) investigate the order book of 37 and 26 international
IPOs and SEOs. They nd that bids from large, frequent bidders that include a limit price a¤ect
6the issue price. It is concluded that book-building is designed to extract information from investors.
Underwriters use investor bids when determining the o¤er price. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002)
look at allocations between institutional and retail investors for 1,032 international IPOs. They nd
that institutional investors are favored over retail investors. They nd that increased institutional
allocations results in higher o¤er price deviations from the midpoints of the book-building pricing
ranges. They conclude that underwriters use institutional bids to set o¤er prices in the IPOs.
Binay, Gatchev and Pirinsky (2007) investigate 4,668 U.S. IPOs and nd that underwriters favor
institutions they have previously worked with. They nd that a relationship with the underwriter
is more important in IPOs with strong demand, IPOs of less liquid rms and IPOs by less famous
underwriters. It is argued that favoring regular investors is done to price IPOs more correctly.
Regular investors have incentives to report their true value in the book-building so that they will be
favored in future IPOs. Bubna and Prabhala (2007) investigate 137 Indian IPO allocations. They
nd that book-building and discretion in allocation enhances pre-market price discovery. All these
papers are consistent with the academic view.
Jenkinson and Jones (2004) study 27 European IPO order books. They nd that there is limited
information gathering in the book-building procedure. This is inconsistent with the academic view.
Aggarwal (2002) investigate the pitchbook view by looking at ipping activity of institutional and
retail investors for 193 U.S. IPOs. Aggarwal (2002) nd that institutions ip a larger part of
allocations than retail investors. This is taken as evidence against the pitchbook view. This view
argues that institutions are allocated more IPO shares because institutions are more likely to be buy-
and-hold than retail investors. Jenkinson and Jones (2004) nd evidence in favor of the pitchbook
view. Allocations are made to buy-and-hold investors.
There are four types of IPO rent seeking that have led to investigations (and settlements) between
the SEC or NASD and di¤erent investment banks, see Liu and Ritter (2010). IPO allocations can
7be tied to future corporate business (IPO spinning), aftermarket purchases of IPO shares (IPO
laddering) and brokerage commissions. Companies can also agree to heavy underpricing in return
for aftermarket coverage from star analysts provided by the investment bank (analyst conict of
interest). The underpriced shares are then allocated to clients that generate high commissions. All of
these allocation practices have been looked at in di¤erent studies. Liu and Ritter (2010) investigate
IPO spinning, Fjesme (2010) investigate IPO laddering, Cli¤ and Denis (2004) investigate analyst
conict of interest and Reuter (2006) and Nimalendran, Ritter and Zhang (2006) investigate IPO
allocations for commission trading. See Figure 1 for a description of the four types of IPO rent
seeking. See Table 1 for a description of the di¤erent papers that study IPO rent seeking.
Reuter (2006) investigates if IPO allocations are tied to brokerage commissions by studying
1,868 IPOs on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq in the period 1996 to 1999. Reuter (2006) nds a positive
relationship between commissions paid by mutual funds to IPO lead underwriters and mutual fund
holdings of IPO shares after the listing. It is concluded that commission generation is a likely reason
behind IPO allocations (for mutual funds). Nimalendran, Ritter and Zhang (2006) study investor
trades in the 50 most liquid stocks in the U.S. during the days surrounding IPO allocations. They
show that trading volume in the 50 most liquid stocks is positively related to the money left on the
table in IPOs. It is suggested that this increased trading is done purely to increase commissions as
payment for share allocations. Both of these papers support the rent seeking view. Reuter (2006)
establish a link between IPO allocations and commission for mutual funds, but it is not investigated
if commission is important for IPO allocations to other investors due to data limitations.
3. Theoretical predictions and testable implications
Investors are placed on A, B and C lists by investment banks before any IPO.6 (See Figure 2
6The information about IPO allocation practices is obtained from meetings with former Norwegian investment
bankers.
8for the steps in the IPO allocation process). Investors from the A list, that applies for shares, are
more likely to receive more IPO allocations than investors on the B lists etc. We do not know how
investors are placed on the A, B and C lists. The investment bank prepares a list with proposed
allocations after the book building/pricing of the IPOs. This list is given to the board of the issuing
company, and the board of the issuing company determines IPO allocations from this proposed
list. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most boards approve the proposed list without adjustments.
Being on the A list of the lead investment bank is therefore very important when applying for IPO
shares.
In this paper, we test if information gathering, allocation to long term buy-and-hold investors or
rent seeking are likely reasons behind IPO allocations. We measure if providing price information,
price stability or brokerage commission are able to place investors on the A list of investment banks.
It is tested if any of these services will increase the number of allocated IPO shares. All three views
are investigated in the same data set. The three allocation views are not mutually exclusive within
or between IPOs. It is possible that di¤erent IPOs are allocated mainly on di¤erent views. It is
also possible that di¤erent shares are allocated based on di¤erent views within one IPO.
3.1 The rent seeking view of IPO allocations
Rent seeking is an area that have received allot of attention in the media, but not allot of
empirical research. A likely reason for this is that it is very hard to obtain data to test for rent
seeking. Testing for money transfers from one bank account to another obviously requires a very
detailed data set. The cover up activities needed to hide transfers as legitimate activities can be very
creative. In this paper we focus on the rent seeking suggested in Reuter (2006) and Nimalendran,
Ritter and Zhang (2006). In this paper we study if IPO allocations are tied to brokerage commission
rates. See Figure 1 for a overview of the di¤erent ways it is suggested that rent seeking can take
place (Liu and Ritter, 2010).
9In the Robert Stevenson settlement (an investment bank settled to pay a ne for alledgedly tying
IPO allocations to commissions) it was argued that clients both increased trading and increased
actual commission rates per trade to receive IPO shares.7 It is not possible to detect increases in
payments for actual trades in the data, but it is possible to detect if investors that trade more are
also allocated more IPO shares.
The basic idea of commission trading is that investors generate commissions as payments for
IPO allocations. The data only let us test for commission generation on monthly trading.8 It is
possible that commission trading takes place even if it does not show in the analysis. It is also tested
if commission generation is more important for some investor groups than for others. It is possible
that institutional investors have to commit to excessive trading and that retail investors do not. It
is also necessary to test if there is a link between the number of IPO participations and commission.
If rent seeking is an active strategy, there will be a strong relation between brokerage commission
and the number of IPO participations. It is possible that investors that get repeated allocations do
so because they generate high commissions. IPO investors with single time IPO allocation may be
kept out of future IPOs because they do not generate su¢ cient levels of commission.
The dependent variable is the number of allocated shares, to each investor, divided by the
number of shares issued in the IPOs. This variable is regressed on the accumulated commission
generated by the allocated investors and a set of control variables. Commission is accumulated over
monthly portfolio changes in the past 24 months prior to any IPO. Only buy generated commission
is included to avoid any issues related to portfolio rebalancing (to make room for the new shares).
7See January 9, 2003 NASD settlement http://www.nra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2003/P002957
8Commissions are generated from monthly data and not daily data. Because of this it is possible that commission
trading takes place even if we are not able to nd it in our data set. If commissions are generated from daily buy
and sell orders in the same shares we are not able to detect this. It is also possible that some investors pay higher
commission rates to get allocations. This should, however, be discovered in auditing. Liu and Ritter (2010) suggest
that allocations can be given for 1) Spinning or the allocation to CEOs in return for future business (Loughran and
Ritter, 2004). 2) Laddering or allocation in return for subsequent purchases of the IPO share in the aftermarket (Hao,
2007 and Fjesme, 2010). 3) Excessive trading (Reuter, 2006). 4) Analyst coverage (Cli¤ and Denis, 2004).
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If investors that generate more commission are also allocated more IPO shares, we conclude that
the rent seeking view is an accurate view of the IPO market. If there is no relationship between
commission and IPO allocations, we are not able to reject the rent seeking view because it is possible
to hide this type of trading.
3.2 The Pitchbook view of IPO allocations
The pitchbook view comes from the sales pitch slides of the investment banks (Ritter, 2003). In
these slides it is usually argued that investments banks will allocate shares to long term buy-and-
hold investors. It is argued that buy-and-hold investors will create price stability. If buy-and-hold is
an accurate view, investors that buy-and-hold IPO shares must also receive future IPO allocations.
There must also be a punishment in terms of no future IPO allocations for investors that sell shares
early (ipping).9
An investment bank that underwrite many IPOs will have a more reliable reward/threat system
than less active investment banks. Therefore, it should be more buy-and-hold investors in IPOs by
active investment banks. It should also not be possible for investors to repeat a ipping strategy in
IPOs by the same bank over time. If buy-and-hold investors do not have the potential threat of not
receiving future allocations, there is no point of being buy-and-hold. If investors that continue to ip
their shares still get IPO allocations, this is support against the pitchbook view. Allocated investors
are divided into two groups. Group one investors ip their shares (sell within the rst month) and
group two investors are long term investors (hold their shares over six months). Flipping investors
are normally meant to be investors that sell their allocated shares during the rst day of trading
(Krigman, Shaw and Womack, 1999). We really want to test how selling shares early a¤ects future
allocations. It is therefore more accurate for our analysis to include all shareholders that sell their
9The rent seeking view and the academic view can be tested in one specic of several unrelated IPOs. The buy-
and-hold view should be tested in several related IPOs. The key of the buy-and-hold view is that investors that
provide this service over time are allocated shares over time. Investors that hold shares in the long run are rewarded
with more shares in the future. Investors that sell shares early are punished by no future allocations.
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shares within the rst month as ipping investors. To control for past buy-and-hold behaviors we
add the number of times investors have been, out of all past IPO participations, placed in category
one or two. This will control for past buy-and-hold and past ipping activity in all previous IPO
participations. The past buy-and-hold and past ipping variables are calculated both on the total
sample and on a bank by bank basis.
The view is tested by regressing IPO allocations on the past level of buy-and-hold and ipping.
If investors are allocated shares because they are buy-and-hold, the buy-and-hold variable will be
positively related to IPO allocations, and the ipping variable will be negatively related to IPO
allocations. It is possible that both the buy-and-hold and commissions are important for IPO
allocations because the views are not mutually exclusive. Because of this, the past trading buy-
and-hold and pas ipping are included as control variables when testing the other views as well.
3.3 The academic view of IPO allocations
The idea of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) is that investment banks meet with investors to set
the price and demand of the IPOs. The investment banks use this information to build a demand
curve of the company shares. Investors are rewarded for their service from IPO shares that are
underpriced on average. It is controlled that the academic view is not driving the results by including
a dummy variable that takes the value of one for all professional investors (nancial institutions) in
all regressions. It is possible that other investors, like non-nacial institutions or retail investors, are
participating in pricing of the shares, but it is not expected that this is very common. Investment
banks are likely to go to professional investors when they price the issues. To test the academic
view more directly we proceed in the direction of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002). The percentage
change from the midpoint in the initial pricing range to the o¤er price is used as the measure of
pricing information. This variable should change when more pricing information is collected. The
percentage change from the midpoint in the pricing range to the o¤er price is regressed on the
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combined allocation percentage to nancial institutions and a set of control variables. If there is
pricing information, the nancial institution allocation percentage will be signicantly related to
the percentage change in the pricing range. When nancial institutions get IPO allocations there
should be a signicant e¤ect on the price. This analysis can only be performed on the 71 IPOs that
are priced through book-building.
4. Data
There are 403 new listings on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in the period January 1993 to
September 2007. In total, 193 of the 403 companies listed through private placements, cross listings,
spin-o¤s to existing shareholders or directly without any o¤erings. There are 89 companies with no
o¤erings to new shareholders. The remaining 210 companies listed through IPOs. In 30 of these
IPOs we have obtained the 24,560 IPO allocations. In 156 IPOs we have obtained 165,562 IPO
allocations with less than one month of aftermarket trading. The 165,562 IPO allocations are used
to robustness test the results.
One listing requirement on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) is that all shareholders must be
registered in the Norwegian Central Depository (VPS) before the listing. The number of shares
owned by each investor must be given to the VPS before any company can list publicly. This
database is 100% accurate, as it is not possible to list otherwise. The VPS database includes all
shareholders in all companies that are publicly listed or intend to list publicly. This database is
used to obtain the IPO allocations by taking the di¤erence in company ownership before and after
allocation dates.10 Table 2 gives the annual distribution of IPOs on the OSE in the period 1993
10 In 16 of the 210 IPOs it has not been possible to calculate IPO allocations from the ownership data. These
companies are listed in the database (VPS) in the same month as the listing month. These companies are therefore
removed from the sample. In two companies there is missing allocation data, and in four companies it has not been
possible to locate the pricing information (no o¤er price). These IPOs are therefore not included in the analysis.
There are two privatizations in the period that are removed. The nal sample is 186 IPOs with allocation and pricing
data. 210 IPO companies - 16 companies that list in both VPS, OSE and IPO in the same month - 2 privatizations -
2 missing VPS data - 4 missing prospectus and newspaper articles on pricing = 186 companies.
13
to 2007. Only IPO allocations to new shareholders are investigated. More allocations to existing
shareholders are removed. Allocation dates are collected from the IPO listing prospectuses. Figure
3 gives a detailed description of how the IPO allocations are obtained for the di¤erent company
groups.
Some companies list in the VPS database in years before the listing, and other companies
list in VPS as part of the listing process. From this database the IPO allocations are obtained.
Allocations, by investor ID, are calculated as the di¤erence in company share holdings before and
after allocation dates. The number of shares by each investor ID is observed at the end of each
month. All companies list in VPS, sell shares in the IPO and list on OSE. In terms of IPO allocations
there are three dates that are important in the listing process. When companies list in the VPS
ownership database, when companies distribute shares in the IPO and when companies list on
OSE inuence IPO allocations. Companies do this process in di¤erent orders. This leads to three
di¤erent levels of detail in the obtained IPO allocations. All ownership is observed on a monthly
level, so if more than one listing event is performed within the same calendar month we are not able
to distinguish between the events.
4.1 The IPO allocations
Group one companies list their ownership in the database in good time before the IPO. These
companies also list on OSE in the calendar month after the IPO. For these companies the IPO
allocations are completely accurate. There are 24,560 IPO allocations in these 30 IPOs (group
one). Some of these allocations are the same investors that are allocated shares in more than one
IPO. IPO allocations for group one companies are obtained as the end of IPO month company
ownership minus the ownership prior to the IPO month ownership. The owners that are left are
the IPO allocated investors. Over The Counter (OTC) trading in the IPO allocation month will
be treated as IPO allocations. It is not expected that OTC trading will be a big issue because few
14
investors are likely to trade shares in this period. Few IPO allocated investors are likely to sell
their allocation and potentially lose out on the rst day return. The average time between IPO
allocations and listing is less than two weeks in the 30 sample IPOs.
4.2 Aftermarket ownership
Group two companies list in VPS in good time before the IPO, but these companies list on
OSE in the same month as the IPO allocation month. These companies have IPO allocations
that include the actual IPO allocations and some aftermarket trading (151 companies out of 186).
The IPO allocations for these companies includes from one to 30 days of aftermarket trading. IPO
allocations for group two companies is calculated as the listing month (and IPO allocation month)
end of month company ownership minus the company ownership prior to the listing month. The
investor holdings that are left are the allocated investors and the investors that have purchased
shares in the period between the listing day and the end of the listing month. Group two company
IPO allocations includes some aftermarket trading, but it is expected that most of these allocations
are actual IPO allocations. If past trading activity is important for current allocations, this will be
reected in the data even if it includes some aftermarket trading. This is especially true for the
past buy-and-hold trading variables. Buy-and-hold investors will not sell their allocated shares, so
if past buy-and-hold behavior is important for future IPO allocations this will be observed in the
group two IPO allocations. Group two IPO allocations can, however, not be used to reject that
ipping investors are not punished for selling shares early even if this is not found in the data.
This is because some of the ipping investors are lost in the way the group two IPO allocations are
obtained.
Group three companies list in the VPS database in the same month as the IPO allocation month.
These companies have allocations that consist of both allocated investors and existing owners who
have not sold their shares ( 5 companies). These IPO allocations does not include any aftermarket
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trading. IPO allocations for these companies are calculated as the end of listing in VPS month
ownership (and IPO allocation month ownership). Previous owners for these companies are not
removed. Group two and three IPO allocations are used to robustness test results. The past
aftermarket trading in group two and three IPOs are also used to test how past IPO trading is
related to current IPO aftermarket holdings.
4.3 Variable description
Investor characteristics, for the individual investors on OSE in the period 1993 to 2007, are
described in Table 3. The dependent variable "(Allocated shares/shares issued) %" is allocated
shares to each investor divided by the total number of shares issued in the IPO. This is the same
dependent variable as in Reuter (2006). The all IPO sample of 190,504 IPO allocations (in 186
IPOs) is trimmed at 0.1% to 190,122 allocations. This has no e¤ect on results. This is done to
remove the most extreme IPO allocations. These allocations are not likely to be made to investors
because of their past trading characteristics (e.g. more than 20% of the IPO shares). "Commission"
is the accumulated brokerage commission generated by each investor in the two years before the IPO
allocation dates.11 Commission is calculated as the monthly portfolio turnover times share prices
and a xed percentage commission rate.12 Commission is calculated as buy generated commissions
11Commissions are generated from monthly data and not daily data. Because of this it is possible that commission
trading takes place even if we are not able to nd it in our data set. If commissions are generated from daily buy and
sell orders in the same shares, then we are not able to detect this. It is also possible that some investors pay higher
commission rates to get allocations. This should, however, be discovered in auditing. Previous literature suggests
that allocations can be given for 1) Spinning or the allocation to CEOs in return for future business (Loughran and
Ritter, 2004 and Xiaoding and Ritter, 2009). 2) Laddering or allocation in return for subsequent purchases of the
IPO share in the aftermarket (Hao, 2007). 3) Excessive trading (Reuter, 2006 and Nimalendran, Ritter and Zhang,
2007).
12We construct two separate data sets. In the rst data set we obtain the allocated shares in the IPOs. The
second data set is constructed by using the allocated shares in the rst data set. For all allocated investors we collect
the portfolio of publicly traded shares on OSE. We collect the change in the monthly portfolio ownership for each
investor and this is multiplied with the correct market stock prices and the standard commission rates. The average
commission rate o¤ered by the 11 biggest internet share trading companies in Norway is 0,075%. Some investors are
likely to buy shares directly from their broker at a higher commission rate. We use the commission rate of 0,075% for
all investors. The nal number is the monthly commissions paid by each investor. The commission generated in each
specic IPO is removed.
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only. Commission is accumulated in the 24 month period before and after each IPO for all allocated
investors in all IPOs.13 Only commission by investors that do at least one trade in each of the four six
months periods before the IPO are included. This has no e¤ect on results as most investors trade in
all four periods. This is done to remove investors that buy a large block of a company in one period
without trading in the other periods. Generated commission below the minimum rate is replaced
by the xed minimum fee for one transaction ($15). The "non-negative underpricing dummy"
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for all IPOs with zero or positive underpricing.
The variable "commission*D" is commission times the non-negative underpricing dummy. This
variable is calculated to test if generated commission is more important in IPOs with a non-negative
underpricing. The variable "Portfolio value" is the portfolio value in million USD for each allocated
investor at 31.12.xx in the year before the IPO allocation date. This is calculated as the accumulated
value of shares held at 31.12xx times share prices for each allocated investor.
"Previous IPOs" is the accumulated previous IPO participations by the investors divided by
the accumulated IPO number in the sample. This is used to measure how many IPOs, out of all
possible, each investor have participated in. "Previous buy-and-hold" is the accumulated previous
number of times the allocated investor has been a buy-and-hold investor divided by all previous
IPO participations. This is the number of times, out of all previous IPO participations, the investor
has held some IPO allocated shares for more than six months.
"Previous ipping" is the accumulated number of times the investor have ipped previous IPOs
divided by all previous IPO participations. Flipping is when all shares are sold within one month
after a listing. This is the number of times, out of all previous IPO participations, the investor has
held all IPO allocated shares for less than one month. "Held cold IPO dummy" is a dummy variable
13All commission variables are related to IPO allocations. Only buy generated commission in the 24 month period
before the IPOs is used as commission in the current version of the paper. This is to avoid any issues related to sell
generated commissions from rebalancing portfolios before IPOs. The results are the same when di¤erent measures of
commission are used.
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that takes the value of one if the IPO has a positive underpricing and the investor is allocated shares
in a previous IPO with negative underpricing. This variable is used to test if investors receive shares
in hot IPOs because they accepted to take shares in previous cold IPOs. The "Previous IPOs",
"Previous buy-and-hold", "Previous ipping" and "Held cold IPO dummy" are calculated on all
186 IPOs when allocations of the 30 exact IPOs are studied separately. The variables are also
recalculated on a bank by bank basis when the banks are studied separately. "Financial institution
dummy" is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for investors that are either Norwegian or
foreign nancial institutions.
IPO level characteristics and the aggregate distribution of allocations between the di¤erent
investor groups are given in Table 4. "Market value" is the total market value in USD at the listing
date of the IPO company. This is calculated as the number of outstanding shares times the rst day
closing price. "BV/MV" is the book to market ratio of the IPO company at the listing date. This
is calculated as the book value of equity, after the IPO, divided by the market value. "O¤er price"
is the o¤er prices in USD reported in the listing prospectus or in the newspapers. "VC dummy" is
a dummy variable that takes the value of one for companies with venture capital baking. "Tech
dummy" is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for IT -companies. "Year dummy" are
dummy variables for each of the 15 years in the sample period. "Company dummy" are dummy
variables for each of the 186 companies in the sample. "Lead manager IPOs" is the number of times
the manager has been lead in the sample period. "Lead manager market share" is the market share
of the lead manager. This is calculated by the percentage market capitalization of the companies
taken public out of total in the sample. There are 32 di¤erent mangers in the 186 IPOs. There is
one very big manager with 23 IPOs. There are 13 managers with one IPO each. The ten biggest
managers underwrite 144 of the 186 IPOs. There are 15 di¤erent managers that underwrite the 30
sample IPOs. The ve biggest managers underwrite 21 out of 30 IPOs.
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5. Empirical results
The main empirical result is that there is a strong and robust relationship between brokerage
commission generated in the period before the IPO allocation and the number of allocated IPO
shares. This is true for all investor types (retail and institutions). There is no consistent relationship
between previous IPO share holding periods and current IPO allocations. There is not more change
in the pricing range of book-built IPOs when more shares are allocated to nancial institutions. We
conclude that IPOs are allocated to the investors that generate the most brokerage commissions.
5.1 The Rent seeking view of IPO allocations
Table 5 show that there is a positive relationship between generated brokerage commission and
IPO allocations for the 30 allocation IPO sample (group one companies). IPO allocated shares
(scaled by total issued shares in the IPO) is regressed on the accumulated brokerage commission in
the 24 month period before the IPO allocation and a set of control variables. The level of generated
commission is highly related to the number of allocated shares. The results control for investor size
(measured by investors portfolio value), investor past trading behavior (past buy-and-hold, past
ipping, past IPO participations and past accepted cold IPO allocations), investor type (nancial
institution or not), company xed e¤ects, year xed e¤ects and company specic variables.
Commission is also calculated in only IPOs with a non-negative underpricing. E.g. Commission
is multiplied with a dummy variable that takes the value of one for IPOs with a non-negative un-
derpricing. This variable "Commission*D" is used to control if IPOs are only allocated to investors
with a high level of commission when the IPOs are underpriced. The commission in only IPOs
with a positive underpricing is not always signicant. This means that high commission investors
are allocated more shares in general and not only in underpriced IPOs.14 Investors that generate
14 Investors are, however, not likely to always know if IPOs will be under or overpriced. Investors are likely to apply
for the shares they want. It is not certain that it is always the expected underpricing that drives the IPO application.
If this was the case, there would be no IPO applicants in overpriced issues. Investors are likely to apply for shares
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high commission rates are likely to be preferred when they apply for IPO shares regardless of the
underpricing. It is likely that high brokerage commission will place investors on the A, B and C
lists. When investors from these lists apply for shares they are likely to be allocated. It seems
unlikely that investment banks will discourage investors from accepting IPO allocations even if the
issues may fall in price after the listing (even if the investors are from the A, B or C list). IPO
allocations are also studied on the sub groups only retail investors and only institutional investors.
The results remain unchanged.
In Table 6, IPO allocations in group two and three are also included in the analysis. Table 6 show
that there is a positive relationship between generated brokerage commission and IPO allocations
for all IPOs. IPO allocations are made to investors that generate high levels of commissions before
the allocation dates. It is only observed that brokerage commission is generated. It is not observed
that the commission is paid from the investors to the investment banks. This can mean that IPO
shares are allocated to investors as a reward for the received commissions. This can also mean that
banks know what investors that are generating high levels of commission and then IPO shares are
directed to these investors. This can be done in hope of receiving the high commission rates in the
future (this is, however, less likely).15
The number of IPO participations by each investor is also regressed on total brokerage com-
mission generated by each investor. The results are highly signicant and explanatory. There is a
strong relationship between generated commissions and the number of IPO participations by each
investor. Investors that generate more commission also participate in more IPOs than investors that
generate less commission (not reported). The sample sizes in all regressions are very large. The
in some issues that will fall in price after the listing. It is also likely that investment banks will allocate to investors
that generate high commission rates when they apply for IPO shares.
15Commission is calculated as buy generated commission on monthly portfolio changes. This is to avoid any issues
related to portfolio rebalancing to make space for the new IPO shares in the investor portfolios. When sell generated
commission is studied alone or together with buy generated commission the results are the same.
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signicance levels are also correspondingly large. Even if the sample sizes (and the corresponding t
-statistics) are reduced by a large factor, the ndings would still be signicant. The results are not
driven by sample sizes (Kecskes, Michaely and Womack, 2010). We conclude that IPO shares are
allocated to investors depending on their generated brokerage commission in the period before the
IPO.
5.2 The pitchbook view
In previous tables it is controlled that the buy-and-hold view is not driving the results of the rent
seeking view. This is done by including the past number of times investors have been buy-and-hold
or ipping out of past IPO participations in the regressions. In the pitchbook view it is argued that
IPO shares are allocated to investors that are long term buy-and-hold investors. These investors
will create long term price stabilization of the IPO shares. The long term investors will hold their
shares to avoid being blacklisted in future IPOs. Long term buy-and-hold investors can develop a
relationship with investment banks and then be rewarded with future IPO allocations in return for
previous buy-and-hold services.
In Table 5 (the exact IPO allocations) it can be seen that the number of times an investor has
been buy-and-hold in the past is negatively related or unrelated to current IPO allocations. For
retail investors there is actually a positive relationship between past ipping activity and current
IPO allocations. In Table 6 (all IPO allocations) the exact same results appear. This indicates that
there is no or limited IPO allocations to buy-and-hold investors.
The 30 exact IPOs are underwritten by several di¤erent investment banks. The same is true
when all 186 IPOs are studied together. It is possible that this is causing the results. In many
listing prospectuses there are two to three participating investment banks. It is then assumed that
the bank that is mentioned rst on the cover page of the listing prospectus is the lead investment
bank. The single most active bank underwrites 23 IPOs in the sample period. To really study the
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pitchbook view it is necessary to study this sample separately.16
In Table 7 we show that there is not allocations to buy-and-hold investors for the active bank.
There is no signicant relationship between previous holding periods and future IPO allocations
when only the active bank is studied separately. This is the exact same result as in tables 5 and 6.
In Table 7 (regression 2 and 4) investors are also classied as only buy-and-hold investors if they
are never ipping investors in the past. An investors that have a positive value for ipping in the
past will take a zero value for the buy-and-hold by denition. The results remain unchanged. We
are not able to detect any positive relationship between holding periods and IPO allocations. It is
concluded that the pitchbook view is not a likely reason for IPO allocations.
5.3 The academic view
In the previous tables a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the expected pricing
investors (nancial institutions) is included in all regressions. This is to control that the results are
not driven by nancial institutions alone. (Reuter (2006) only study mutual funds that are classied
as nancial institutions). It is, however, not expected that the rent seeking view and the academic
view will generate the same implications in the data. It is not expected that pricing information
investors will generate any more commission than other investors in general.
In Table 8, the academic view is tested more directly. In Table 8, the percentage price revision
in book-built IPOs is regressed on the allocation percentage to nancial institutions and a set of
control variables. This is similar to Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) that regress the percentage price
revision on the percentage IPO allocation between institutional and retail investors. Ljungqvist and
16Most of the IPOs of the very active banks are of the group two IPO allocations. This means that these IPO
allocations includes from one to 30 days of aftermarket trading. We argue that this is of smaller importance when we
study the pitchbook view, as this view argues that the investors hold their shares in the long run. The IPO allocations
from group two will include the long term buy-and-hold investors if they are really buy-and-hold investors. In the
sample it is observed if investors that hold shares in the long run are allocated more shares in future IPOs. The only
problem is that some investors may buy shares after the listing and then hold these shares in the long run. These
investors will be treated as buy-and-hold investors in the data, but they will not be awarded with future shares. It
is expected that there will be less of this type of investors than actual buy-and-hold if buy-and-hold is an accurate
view. Group two IPOs allocations should therefore detect any IPO allocations in return for past buy-and-hold.
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Wilhelm (2002) show that IPO allocations to institutional investors have a signicant impact on
the price revision. They show that there is more change from the midpoint in the initial pricing
range to the o¤er price when more shares are allocated to institutional investors. In Table 8,
we show that IPO allocations to nancial institutions have no impact on the percentage price
revision. IPO allocations to nancial institutions is actually negatively related to changes in the
o¤er price in the book-building period. This indicates that there is no price information collected
from nancial institutions. The same results are found when total allocations to institutions is
investigated separately. The sample size is, however, very low with only 71 book-built IPOs in the
sample.
5.4 Robustness
To test the robustness of the results we test if there is a relationship between share ownership
right after the listing and generated commission for companies with no IPO. There are 89 companies
with a su¢ cient share spread and equity value to list directly at OSE without conducting an IPO
rst. These 89 straight listings are used as a comparable sample. In Table 9 it can be seen that
there is a relationship between commission and share holdings after the listing in non-IPO companies
(listings with no IPO), but that this relationship is weaker than for IPOs. The IPO allocations are
also not trimmed at the 0.1% level for either IPO or non IPO companies. Investor commission is
multiplied with a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the IPO companies. Aftermarket
ownership for both IPO companies and no IPO companies is regressed on brokerage commission.
Brokerage commission is related to aftermarket ownership in non-IPOs, but this relation is much
stronger in IPOs. It is concluded that the relationship between aftermarket share ownership and
brokerage commission is driven by IPO allocations.
In Table 10 the allocated investors are matched one for one with a non allocated investor in
a Tobit regression. These IPO allocations are also not trimmed at the 0.1% level. There are
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24,621 allocated investors. In total 9,498 of these investors are rst observed in the data le with
their IPO allocation. These investors have no previous commission, past trading or portfolio size.
The remaining 15,123 investors are matched one for one with a non allocated investor with no
IPO participations in the last 12 months on investor type, country and number of shares in the
portfolio. Among these investors the investor with the closest portfolio size is selected as the
matching investor. The allocation percentage is then regressed on commission and control variables
in a Tobit regression. Commission is still highly related to IPO allocations. This show that investors
that are allocated IPO shares generate more commission than investors that are not allocated IPO
shares.
6. Conclusion
The main nding is that there is a strong and robust relationship between brokerage commissions
generated by investors before IPOs and the number of shares allocated in IPOs. It its observed
that the investors that generate the most commission also receive the most IPO shares. This
result is consistent for all investor types in all IPOs and in all sample years. This result control
for the portfolio value of the allocated investors, so it is commission and not investor size that
gives IPO allocations. The results also control for past trading behavior (the pithcbook view)
and investor types (information gathering view). The meaning of these results is that there are
strong indications that investors are able to buy IPO allocations with brokerage commissions. The
investors that are the most protable clients for the investment banks are rewarded with the most
protable investments. It can be argued that investors that trade more are also likely to apply
for more shares. The IPOs are, however, on average highly oversubscribed, so some investors are
given more shares than others. We show that the investors that generate more commission also
receive more shares. More IPO allocations are given to investors that generate more commissions
in general.
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There is no evidence that support the information gathering view. There is not a bigger change
in the percentage price revision from the midpoint in the pricing range to the o¤er price when
nancial institutions (or institutions in general) are allocated more shares. There is no support
for the pitchbook view either. There is no detectable relationship between past IPO share holding
periods and current IPO share allocations. This is also true when IPOs are studied on a bank by
bank basis. Some investors are also able to obtain IPO allocations even if they repeatedly ip their
shares.
The conclusion is that more IPO shares are allocated to investors that generate more brokerage
commission. IPO shares are allocated based on rent seeking. The ndings are consistent with
Reuter (2006) and Nimalendran, Ritter and Zhang (2007) in that some IPO shares are allocated in
return for commission trading. A main contribution to the previous literature is that we are able
to combine all views in the same data set. We rank the views as the most to the least important
view. This has not been possible to do before. There is strong evidence supporting the rent seeking
view. There is no evidence supporting the academic view or the pitchbook view.
There are also some practical implications of the study. Investors can be able to increase IPO
allocations by increasing their trading and brokerage commission before IPOs. Investors can be
able to increase IPO allocations by directing trades to certain banks. There should also be more
regulatory investigations into IPO allocation practices by investment banks. It seems like the
exchange of IPO shares with commissions is a widespread practice.
There are some limitations to the study. It is not observed that commission is paid from the
allocated investor to the investment bank. It is only observed that the commission is generated.
Commission is also calculated based on monthly data. This is likely to underestimates commission.
For future research it would be interesting to study brokerage commission that is paid directly to
the investment bank for all the allocated investors on a daily basis.
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Table 1
Related Empirical Papers
Rent seeking view
Reuter (2006) Positive relationship between commissions and
holdings of IPO shares after new listings
Nimalendran, Ritter and Zhang (2006) Positive relationship between money on table
and trading volume in liquid shares
Liu and Ritter (2010) Find evidence of IPO spinning
Cli¤ and Denis (2004) Find evidence of analyst conict of interest
Academic view
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) Regularly participating, large bid and domestic
participants are favored in allocations.
Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) Bids from large, frequent bidders that
include a limit price a¤ect the issue price
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) Increased institutional allocations results in
higher o¤er price deviations from the midpoints
of the book-building pricing ranges
Binay, Gatchev and Pirinsky (2007) Underwriters favor institutions they
have previously worked with
Bubna and Prabhala (2007) Book-building and discretion in allocation
enhances pre-market price discovery
Jenkinson and Jones (2004) Find evidence against the
academic view
Pitchbook view
Aggarwal (2002) Institutions ip more than retail investors
(Evidence against the pitchbook view)
Jenkinson and Jones (2004) Find evidence in favor
of the pitchbook view
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Table 2
The Number of Initial Public O¤erings on the Oslo Stock Exchange
The column labeled "Population" lists the number of Initial Public O¤erings on the Oslo Stock Exchange
in the sample period. The column labeled "Data" indicates the IPOs with allocation data. The column labeled
"Prospectus" lists the IPOs where we have been able to locate the listing prospectus. The column labeled
"Sample" lists the 30 sample IPOs. The columns labeled "Value of shares" list the annually aggregate million
USD values of shares sold in the 173 IPOs with listing prospectus. "All", "New" and "Secondary" indicates the
value of all shares, only newly issued shares and shares sold by existing shareholders respectively. The columns
labeled "Prospectus" and "Sample" is the annual aggregated USD million value of shares sold in the IPOs with
prospectuses and in the 30 IPO sample respectively. Value of shares sold is reported in USD using a USD/NOK
exchange rate of 0.1792. The sample period is January 1993 through September 2007.
Number of IPOs Value of shares USD
All New Secondary
Year Population Data Prospectus Sample Prospectus Sample Prospectus Sample Prospectus Sample
1993 11 9 8 541 539 2
1994 18 12 11 5 626 392 218 142 409 250
1995 18 14 11 3 516 47 113 47 403
1996 14 12 8 3 146 89 65 9 81 80
1997 30 27 21 9 988 229 516 20 472 208
1998 15 11 11 2 233 95 190 94 43 1
1999 4 4 4 60 31 29
2000 12 12 12 2 839 112 765 90 74 22
2001 4 4 4 183 166 17
2002 2 2 2 2 70 70 64 64 6 6
2003 2 2 2 83 78 5
2004 14 14 14 1,605 1,319 287
2005 32 31 31 3 2,069 61 594 51 1,475 11
2006 18 17 17 2,730 2,237 493
2007 16 15 16 1 931 20 537 20 395
Total 210 186 173 30 11,621 1,130 7,431 550 4,190 580
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Table 3
Summary Statistics of Firms Going Public on the Oslo Stock Exchange
Panel A reports the average percentage distributions of the IPOs. The exact sample includes the 30 IPOs
with no aftermarket trading. The total sample includes all 186 IPOs with IPO allocations. Panel B reports the
IPO company characteristics for the 186 and the 30 companies. "Market value (Mill USD)" is the number of
shares outstanding on the listing day times the rst day closing price. "O¤er price" is the USD IPO price in the
listing prospectuses. "Book/Market" is the book value of equity after the IPO divided by the market value on
the listing day. "VC backed dummy" is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company has venture
capital backing."Tech dummy" is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for IT companies. "Percentage
change in pricing range" is change from the midpoint in the pricing range to the o¤er price in book-building
IPOs. "Lead manager IPOs" is the average number of times the lead manager has been lead in the total 186
sample period. "Lead manager market share" is the market share of the lead manager. This is calculated by
the percentage market capitalization of the companies taken public out of total in the sample. USD values are
calculated from a USD/NOK exchange rate of 0.1792. IPO allocations are trimmed at 0.1%
Exact allocations Full Sample
Variable N Mean Std.Dev Median N Mean Std.Dev Median
A. Average Percent Allocation
Retail % 30 30.1% 21.5% 25.8% 186 28.3% 22.3% 23.0%
Norwegian non nancial % 30 29.3% 17.1% 28.6% 186 23.9% 16.1% 19.9%
Norwegian nancial % 30 24.0% 19.3% 23.2% 186 20.8% 15.7% 18.3%
Foreign % 30 10.2% 13.5% 4.4% 186 23.5% 24.7% 12.3%
Other % 30 6.4% 6.6% 3.9% 186 3.5% 6.0% 1.0%
B. IPO Characteristics
Market value (Mill USD) 30 $128.0 $135.1 $98.2 186 $288.3 $837.2 $101
O¤er price USD 30 $11.4 $7.8 $8.2 186 $9.3 $7.0 $7.2
Book/Market 30 0.77 1,4 0.29 186 0.66 0.84 0.42
VC backed dummy 30 0.13 0.35 0 186 0.16 0.37 0
Tech dummy 30 0.07 0.25 0 186 0.11 0.32 0
% change pricing range 30 0 0 0 71 8.3% 8.2% 7.3%
Lead manager IPOs 30 9.8 7.5 7 186 6.3 7.6 3
Lead manager market share 30 4.6% 11.9% 1.3% 186 3.1% 8.2% 0.5%
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Table 4
Summary Statistics on IPO Allocations and on Investors Trading
This table reports the summary statistics for the individual trading prior to the 30 sample IPOs and all 186
IPOs on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 1993 to 2007. Panel A reports the percentage share distribution
between the investor groups. Panel B reports the investor characteristics. "Commission" is the accumulated
commission generated in USD by the investors in the two years before the IPO allocation date. "Non negative
underpricing dummy" takes the value of one for all IPOs with zero or positive underpricing. "Commission *D"
is commission times the Non-negative underpricing dummy. "Portfolio value" is the portfolio value in million
USD for each allocated investor at 31.12.XX in the year before the IPO allocation date. "Previous IPOs" is the
accumulated previous IPO participations by the investors divided by the accumulated IPO number in the sample.
"Previous buy-and-hold" is the accumulated previous number of times the allocated investor has been a buy and
hold investor as a percent of all previous IPO participations. This is the number of times the investor has held
some IPO allocated shares for more then six months in previous IPOs." Previous ipping" is the accumulated
number of times the investor have ipped previous IPOs as a percent of all previous IPO participations before
the IPO allocation. Flipping is when all shares are sold within one month of the listing. "Held cold IPO dummy"
takes the value of one if the IPO has a positive underpricing and the investor is allocated shares in a previous
IPO with negative underpricing. USD values are calculated from a USD/NOK exchange rate of 0.1792. IPO
allocations are trimmed at 0.1%
Exact Sample 30 IPOs Full Sample 186 IPOs
N Mean Std.Dev Median N Mean Std.Dev Median
A. Average Percent Allocation
All %% 24,560 0.1% 0.47% 0.01% 190,122 0.07% 0.46% 0.004%
Retail % 20,030 0.04% 0.20% 0.01% 159,841 0.02% 0.16% 0.003%
Norwegian non nancial % 2,415 0.3% 0.82% 0.05% 14,750 0.23% 0.79% 0.02%
Norwegian nancial % 615 0.88% 1.45% 0.3% 3,881 0.78% 1.55% 0.16%
Foreigners % 969 0.23% 0.84% 0.03% 7,602 0.44% 1.28% 0.02%
Others % 531 0.27% 0.93% 0.03% 4,048 0.13% 0.62% 0.013%
B. Investor Characteristics
Commission USD 24,560 $3,299 $47,380 0 190,122 $8,065 $121,461 0
Non-negative underpricing dummy 24,560 0.73 0.44 1 190,122 0.86 0.35 1
Commission *D 24,560 2,794 43,775 0 190,122 $5,890 $97,280 0
Portfolio value million USD 24,560 3.33 51.3 0 190,122 $4.99 $87.12 0.003
Previous IPOs 24,560 0.05 0.05 0.04 190,122 0.04 0.05 0.02
Previous Buy-and-hold 24,560 0.19 0.36 0 190,122 0.20 0.37 0
Previous Flipping 24,560 0.12 0.28 0 190,122 0.09 0.25 0
Held cold IPO dummy 24,560 0.10 0.30 0 190,122 0.12 0.33 0
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Table 5
IPO Allocations and Generated Commission for the 30 Sample IPOs
This table reports the coe¢ cients and heteroscedastic consistent t -statistics (errors adjusted for clustering
across rms Rogers, 1993) in parentheses for the regressions with the number of allocated shares divided by the
total number of shares issued in the IPO as the dependent variable. This is a standard OLS model. Only the
30 IPOs with exact allocations in the sample period September 1993 to January 2007 are included. All variables
are as described in Table 3 and Table 4. Regression 1 includes all investors. Regression 2 includes only retail
investors. Regression 3 includes only institutional investors. IPO allocations are trimmed at 0.1%
log (Allocated shares/shares issued) %
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3
Intercept 19.2355 -17.6154 3.4154
(79.6) (-51.7) (12.0)
Log (commission) 0.0953 0.0974 0.0564
(5.7) (6.0) (4.0)
Log (commission) *D -0.0801 -0.0788 -0.0282
(-3.7) (-3.7) (-1.9)
Dummy non-negative underpricing -1.5487 2.978 -1.2652
(-40.4) (72.7) (-23.5)
Log (portfolio value) 0.0538 0.0327 0.0709
(4.3) (3.6) (6.0)
Previous IPOs of possible 1.5917 -0.3499 2.4142
(1.8) (-0.8) (2.7)
Previous buy-and-hold of possible -0.1584 -0.0761 -0.1049
(-3.3) (-2.1) (-1.4)
Previous ipping of possible 0.1055 0.2006 -0.3214
(2.8) (3.5) (-2.5)
Held cold IPO dummy 0.0945 0.0113 0.0203
(1.3) (0.3) (0.2)
Financial institution dummy 2.20754 dropped 0.638
(11.4) (4.7)
Log (market value) (-1.2488 (0.5725 (-0.4117
(-84.2) (34.1) (-25.2)
BV / MV equity 0.1095 0.5582 0.3775
(9.4) (65.8) (45.8)
O¤er price 0.0129 -0.0104 0.0008
(22.0) (-36.6) (2.4)
VC backed dummy -2.0392 0.7819 0.8612
(-21.8) (10.8) (14.3)
High-tech dummy dropped 4.85 3.0532
(201.7) (15.9)
Year dummy and Company dummy yes yes yes
Observations 24,560 20,030 4,530
Adjusted R -squared 43.6% 49.0% 37.2%
Investor group All Retail Institution
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Table 6
IPO Allocations and Generated Commission for All 186 IPOs
This table reports the coe¢ cients and heteroscedastic consistent t -statistics (errors adjusted for clustering
across rms Rogers, 1993) in parentheses for the regressions with the number of allocated shares divided by the
total number of shares issued in the IPO as the dependent variable. This is a standard OLS model. All 186 IPOs
with exact allocations in the sample period September 1993 to January 2007 are included. All variables are as
described in Table 3 and Table 4. Regression 1 includes all investors. Regression 2 includes only retail investors.
Regression 3 includes only institutional investors. IPO allocations are trimmed at 0.1%
log (Allocated shares/shares issued) %
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3
Intercept 0.6333 -14.7869 -5.1541
(7.5) (7.5) (-24.5)
Log (commission) 0.082 0.0372 0.0824
(6.9) (3.8) (6.8)
Log (commission) *D 0.006 0.0082 0.0117
(0.3) (0.5) (0.6)
Dummy non-negative underpricing -0.5387 -1.2929 -0.8446
(-3.8) (-19.8) (-7.5)
Log (portfolio value) 0.0466 0.03299 0.0585
(13.1) (12.2) (13.8)
Previous IPOs of possible -0.553 -1.2796 0.9224
(-0.7) (-2.4) (1.3)
Previous buy-and-hold of possible 0.029 0.1258 -0.1417
(0.2) (0.9) (-2.2)
Previous ipping of possible 0.2357 0.3435 -0.2505
(2.4) (4.0) (-2.8)
Held cold IPO dummy 0.0821 0.046 0.0234
(2.2) (1.4) (0.5)
Financial institution dummy 2.0379 dropped 0.6676
(22.6) (7.7)
Log (market value) -0.3067 0.4587 -0.0127
(-76.8) (42.3) (-8.8)
BV / MV equity 0.1383 0.0897 0.0301
(23.3) (6.7) (4.4)
O¤er price -0.0045 -0.0131 0.0111
(-4.8) (-37.8) (51.2)
VC backed dummy 0.351 -2.0255 -0.5148
(30.8) (-537.8) (-29.1)
High-tech dummy -1.378 2.4444 -0.6164
(-119.8) (77.4) (-13.3)
Year dummy and Company dummy yes yes yes
Observations 190,122 159,841 30,281
Adjusted R -squared 78.8% 83.5% 54.5%
Investor group All Retail Institution
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Table 7
IPO Allocations to Buy-And-Hold Investors
This table reports the coe¢ cients and White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics in parentheses
for the regressions with the number of allocated shares divided by the total number of shares issued in the IPO
as the dependent variable. All variables are as described in Table 3 and Table 4. All regressions are standard
OLS models, and the sample period is from January 1993 to September 2007. Only the 23 IPOs by the most
active bank in the sample period is investigated. Previous trading variables are only in past IPOs by the most
active bank. Regression 1 and 2 includes all IPO allocations. Regression 3 and 4 includes only allocation in the
13 underpriced (hot) IPOs. Regression 2 and 4 includes only past buy-and-hold who have never been ipping
investors before. IPO allocations are trimmed at 0.1%
(Allocated shares/shares issued) %
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
Intercept 8.0775 8.0483 10.0923 -1.5412
(4.6) (4.6) (5.0) (-3.2)
Log (commission) 0.0373 0.0372 0.0061 0.0087
(4.6) (5.2) (11.3) (11.0)
Log (commission) *D -0.027 -0.0268 dropped dropped
(-3.8) (-3.8)
Dummy non-negative underpricing 0.0035 0.005 dropped dropped
(0.1) (0.1)
Log (portfolio value) 0.0006 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009
(-0.0) (2.4) (2.3) (3.8)
Previous IPOs of possible 0.1318 0.1366 0.0584 0.0658
(3.5) (3.7) (2.0) (2.4)
Previous buy-and-hold of possible 0.0145 -0.0018 0.0131 0.0037
(1.7) (-0.2) (1.7) (0.4)
Previous ipping of possible -0.0377 -0.027 dropped
(-3.3) (-1.7)
Held cold IPO dummy 0.0614 0.0595 0.0727 0.0741
(2.2) (2.3) (2.6) (2.6)
Financial institution dummy 0.337 0.3385 0.2236 0.2261
(7.1) (7.1) (5.4) (5.5)
Log (market value) -0.6354 -0.6335 -0.5307 -0.0223
(-4.7) (-4.7) (-4.9) (-0.8)
BV / MV equity 1.5328 1.5297 -0.4793 0.4226
(4.5) (4.5) (-5.3) (3.5)
O¤er price 0.0162 0.0415 0.0344 0.0578
(4.4) (4.4) (4.6) (4.7)
VC backed dummy -1.7779 -1.7695 -2.5801 dropped
(-4.7) (-4.7) (-4.9)
High-tech dummy -0.4974 -0.4945 -0.0772 0.2248
(-3.6) (4.6) (-0.5) (1.6)
Year dummy and Company dummy yes yes yes yes
Observations 69,041 69,041 64,566 64,566
Adjusted R -squared 10.6% 10.8% 14.7 11.0%
Included IPOs 23 23 13 13
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Table 8
Allocations of IPOs in Return for Pricing Information
This table reports the coe¢ cients and White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent t -statistics in parentheses
for the regressions with the absolute percentage change in the price revision as the dependent variable. These
are standard OLS models, and all book-built IPOs in the sample period from January 1993 to September 2007
are included. All variables are described in Table 3 and Table 4. Regression 1 includes "Financial institution
allocation %" in all book-built IPOs. Regression 2 includes "Institutional allocation %" in all book-built IPOs.
Absolute % price revision
Reg 1 Reg 2
Intercept 17.7888 11.9459
(2.3) (1.1)
Financial institution allocation % -0.1046
(-2.0)
Institutional allocation % -0.0022
(-0.0)
Log (market value) -0.472 -0.2403
(-1.1) (-0.5)
BV / MV equity -1.3576 -1.4011
(-0.5) (-0.5)
O¤er price 0.016 0.0008
(0.5) (0.0)
VC backed dummy 3.6374 4.1113
(1.5) (1.6)
High-tech dummy 1.2246 0.2923
(0.5) (0.1)
Observations 71 71
Adjusted R -squared 5.8% 0.4%
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Table 9
Commission and Share holdings of Newly Listed Companies with No IPO
This table report the coe¢ cients and White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics in parentheses
for the regressions with the shares owned per investor at the end of the listing month divided by outstanding
shares in the listed company as the dependent variable. There are 89 companies that list with no o¤ering to
new shareholders. All variables are as described in Table 3 and Table 4. Regression 1 includes allocations and
aftermarket ownership in all 186 IPO companies and all 89 companies with no IPO. The Log (commission) is
multiplied with a dummy variable that takes the value of one for all 186 IPO companies. The regressions are
standard OLS models, and the sample period is from January 1993 to September 2007. The dummy IPO takes
that value of one for all investors in the 186 IPOs and zero for all the investors in the 89 no IPO companies. "Log
(commission) * Dummy IPO" is investor commission in all IPOs and zero commission in all 89 no IPOs. IPO
allocations are not trimmed for either IPO or non IPO companies.
Variables (Shares holdings/shares outstanding) %
Reg 1
Intercept -11.2013
(-2.6)
Log (commission) 0.0043
(4.2)
Log (commission) * Dummy IPO 0.02
(12.3)
Dummy IPO 13.8932
(4.5)
Log (portfolio value) -0.0007
(-1.7)
Previous IPOs of possible 1.7109
(10.1)
Previous buy-and-hold of possible -0.0803
(-10.7)
Previous ipping of possible -0.0627
(0.6)
Financial institution dummy 0.5956
(15.5)
Year dummy yes
Company dummy yes
Observations 382,210
Adjusted R -squared 10.0%
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Table 10
Matching Allocated Investors with Non-Allocated Investors
This table reports the coe¢ cients and White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent t -statistics in parentheses
for the regressions with the number of allocated shares divided by the total number of shares issued in the IPO
as the dependent variable. This is a standard Tobit regression. All allocated investors are matched one for one
with a non allocated investor. The non allocated investors takes a value of zero for "(Allocated shares/shares
issued) %". IPO allocations are not trimmed. Regression 1 includes the 24,621 exact IPO allocations and 15,123
matched investors that did not receive IPO allocations. Regression 2 includes only investors with a positive level
of commission. There are then 13,340 IPO allocations and 10,322 non allocated matching investors.
(Allocated shares/shares issued) %
Reg 1 Reg 2
Intercept 28.2926 44.631
(6.6) (5.9)
Log (commission) 0.0268 0.0826
(5.3) (5.2)
Log (commission) *D -0.0017 0.0304
(-0.3) (1.4)
Dummy non-negative underpricing -0.9684 -7.1474
(-4.1) (-5.6)
Log (portfolio value) -0.0409 -0.0356
(-6.8) (-5.6)
Previous IPOs of possible 12.2889 11.9004
(6.5) (5.7)
Previous buy-and-hold of possible 0.0632 0.2206
(1.9) (4.9)
Previous ipping of possible 0.0431 0.2409
(1.5) (4.5)
Held cold IPO dummy -0.4904 -0.5522
(-7.0) (-6.4)
Financial institution dummy 0.514 0.2052
(5.0) (2.5)
Log (market value) -1.343 -2.28
(-6.5) (-6.0)
BV / MV equity -0.3316 -0.5226
(-6.2) (-5.6)
O¤er price -0.0255 0.0047
(-6.2) (5.4)
VC backed dummy -3.657 11.2446
(-6.0) (5.2)
High-tech dummy -4.7316 -23.4354
(-6.1) (-5.6)
Year dummy, Company dummy yes yes
Observations 39,744 23,662
Pseudo R -squared 9.7% 10.5%
38
Figure 1
The di¤erent IPO Allocation Views
Ritter (2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) argue that there are three views on how IPOs are allocated.
First, is the academic view based on Benveniste and Spindt (1989). In this view, investment banks allocate IPO
shares to informed investors in return for true valuation and demand information. Second, is the pitchbook view
where investment banks allocate shares to institutional investors that are likely to be buy-and-hold. Finally, is
the rent seeking view where investment banks allocate shares to investors in return for some form of kickback.
Table 1 includes a reference to the di¤erent articles that investigate each of the views.
The Rent seeking view
Commission Shares are allocated to investors that generate
high levels of brokerage commissions.
IPO spinning Shares are allocated to company executives to attract
corporate business.
IPO laddering Shares are allocated to investors that will provide
aftermarket share price support. Underpriced shares are
allocated to investors that generate high
brokerage commissions.
Analyst overage Companies accept underpricing in exchange for future.
research coverage. Underpriced shares are allocated
to investors that generate high brokerage commissions.
The pitchbook view
Shares are allocated to investors that are expected to be
buy-and-hold. This will create long run price stability
The academic view (information gathering)
Shares are allocated to investors that report true share values.
Shares are exchanged with price information
39
Figure 2
Timeline of the Listings on the Oslo Stock Exchange
Listing in VPS is when the company list ownership records in the ownership database. This is when the
ownership records are observed in the data the rst time. Public O¤ering is when the companies distribute the
allocated shares in the ownership database. The public o¤ering is in most cases in the month before (30 exact
IPOs) or the month of the listing (151 IPOs).
Timeline of the listing
Company list shares in the VPS database
Six months before the listing
The company selects an investment bank
The initial meeting between company, investment bank and OSE
Compliance report is nalized by the investment bank
The legal and accounting due diligence is performed
The formal application is submitted to OSE
Prospectus is nalized and distributed
IPO shares are priced through meetings with investors
One month before the listing Shares are transferred in the Public O¤ering
Listing month Listing
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Figure 3
Timeline of the IPO allocations for the di¤erent groups
Listing in database is when the company list ownership records in the ownership database. This is when the
ownership records are observed in the data the rst time. IPO allocation is when the companies distribute the
allocated shares in the ownership database. Group 1 to 3 is the ordering of the group of detail in the allocations.
Group 1 is 100% accurate IPO allocations. Group 2 IPO allocations includes one to 30 days of aftermarket
trading. Group 3 IPO allocations includes existing owners who have not sold all of their shares in the IPO. There
are 30, 151 and 5 companies in group 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Timeline of the listing Six months before One month before Listing month
the listing the listing
Group 1 Listing in database IPO allocation Listing
Group 2 Listing in database IPO allocation
Listing
Group 3 Listing in database Listing
IPO allocation
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